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"Under the auspices of peace": The Northwest Indian War and its Impact
on the Early American Republic
Abstract

This paper examines the influence of the Northwest Indian War on the development of the early United States
republic. In the years between the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783 and the establishment of a new
federal government in 1789, the United States frontier was plagued by rivalry between citizens and Native
Americans. The United States federal government viewed the success and progress of the nation as contingent
upon possession of the Northwest Territory, and as such developed and adjusted their Indian policies to
induce the Indians to peacefully accept United States authority in the Northwest Territory. The violence that
erupted out of the deterioration of these attempts resulted in demands by citizens to quell the aggressive
Indians in the early years of George Washington's presidency, which consequently invited reforms that
ultimately strengthened the federal government's power.
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"Under the Auspices of Peace":
The Northwest Indian War and its Impact on
the Early American Republic
By
Melanie L. Fernandes
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In April, 1789, George Washington was inaugurated as the
first president of the United States of America. Filled with pride
for his new country and hope for its future, he spoke in his
inaugural address about the prospects of the United States.
Washington was clear that above all, the new government of the
United States should do right by itself to preserve the nation and
protect its citizens:
In these honorable qualifications, I
behold the surest pledges, that as on
one side, no local prejudices, or
attachments; no seperate [sic] views,
nor party animosities, will misdirect
the comprehensive and equal eye
which ought to watch over this great
assemblage of communities and
interests: so, on another, that the
foundations of our National policy
will be laid in the pure and
immutable principles of private
morality; and the pre-eminence of a
135

free Government, be exemplified by
all the attributes which can win the
affections of its Citizens, and
command the respect of the world. 231
Washington wanted for no particular group's interests to dictate the
government's policies, and he wanted to ensure that the
government would always have the nation and its citizens' best
interests in mind. For Washington, this was one means of working
towards his main goal for the nation: that the United States as a
new nation would "command the respect of the world."
In order to achieve this, Washington had numerous
ambitious, but necessary, goals for the nation.

He wanted to

reduce the national debt, establish a strong currency, and reopen
trade and renew amiable relations with the British. In short, his
goals all had to do with economic and national security, which he
understood to be crucial to the protection and success of the nation.
Washington and his contemporaries knew that proving the
legitimacy of the United States to major European powers was
extremely important during the early years of the republic, as this
was when it was most vulnerable. Unfortunately for these men, the
process of establishing the foundation of the United States was far
more complicated than they would have hoped. Along with all the
pressures of establishing order and an effective government,
231

Dorothy Twohig, The Papers of George Washington, Presidential Series
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managing the national debt from the Revolutionary War, and
attempting to reconcile with Great Britain, the United States faced
conflict with Indian tribes that threatened the entire success of the
nation.
It is undeniable that the nation’s early success was largely
tied to Indian relations. In some sense this was because
Washington and other national leaders saw the nation’s success as
contingent upon the opening of the Northwest Territory. The
Treaty of Paris, which signified the official end of the American
Revolution in 1783, extended the western border of the United
States to the Mississippi River. The Continental Congress, the
governing body from the Revolution until the establishment of the
new federal government in 1789, planned to decrease national debt
by selling this land to settlers on the western frontier.
However, the Native Americans living in this territory were
not consulted when the Treaty of Paris was signed. Tension and
animosity exploded as the United States attempted to assert their
dominance on the lands that Native Americans still claimed. These
tensions had years to build up between the end of the
Revolutionary War and when Washington took office in 1789.
However, until Washington's presidency the Continental Congress
did not take Native American opinion into consideration when
forming Indian policy. Continued violence marked the relationship
between the frontier settlers and several western Native American
tribes. As a result, Washington accepted his presidency just as
137

conflicts were reaching a climax. Frontiersmen demanded federal
protection from the Indians; Indians refused to cede their lands,
demanding that the borderline of the United States be moved back
to its previous point at the Ohio River. Yet, with no regular army,
minimal federal funds, and a government in its infancy,
Washington was hardly in an optimal position to deal with this
conflict. It was crucial that he deal with this issue effectively, as
this was one of the first tests of the new nation's governing ability.
Washington was torn. While he wanted to come to a
peaceful settlement with the dominant Northwestern Indian tribes,
the Indians were not willing to make peace with the new
Mississippi River land boundary and the United States was not
willing to give up the Northwest Territory. Settlers were eager to
move into the area, and Congress linked the progress of the nation
to the acquisition of this territory. It seemed that Washington had
no choice but to assert American authority and use force against
the Indians. After all, simply conceding to them would make the
United States federal government appear weak to Great Britain, the
Indian tribes, and to the citizens of the United States. The federal
government decided it would be in the United States' best interest
to launch a military expedition to punish the aggressive Indian
tribes.
The military campaigns sent by the United States to quell
Indian hostilities in the Ohio country between 1790-1795 are
collectively known as the Northwest Indian War. Historians have
138

noted this conflict as significant, and even critical, both in the
course of Washington's presidency and the early development of
the nation. However, there was no shortage of adversities for
Washington to overcome as the first president of the United States,
and the Northwest Indian War is often depicted as another issue on
the list. Typically, this scholarship explores the Northwest Indian
War in the context of overall Indian relations in the United States
between

1785-1815.

232

Even

Wiley

Sword's

President

Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest,
1790-1795 spends relatively little time exploring the deeper
implications that these events had on the development of the
United States. 233 More recently, Colin Calloway and William
Patrick Walsh have focused on the nation's response to this
conflict, but neither considers its impact in defining federal powers
over the West and the states. 234 An examination of the papers of
George Washington and his contemporaries indicates how they
used the Northwest Indian War as an opportunity to strengthen the
federal government. Native American relations and policy during
232
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this period were instrumental in defining the roles and abilities of
the federal government. In many ways, the Northwest Indian War
gave the United States the opportunity to establish how the federal
government would be viewed not just by its own citizens, but by
dominant powers of the world.

Securing Indian Lands
A great deal of conflict occurred between the end of the
Revolutionary War in 1783 and the establishment of the new
federal

government

in

1789.

This

conflict

defined

the

circumstances leading ultimately to the Northwest Indian War.
During these years the United States operated under the governing
body of the Continental Congress, which was established in 1774.
At this time Congress set the precedent for what the United States'
Native American policy would be, and the events of this period
directly affected the circumstances that surrounded Washington
when he entered the presidency.
At the conclusion of the American Revolution, the United
States and Britain both signed the Treaty of Paris to officially
establish peace between them. As a concession of this treaty,
Britain ceded the land known as the Northwest Territory to the
United States; the United States' western boarder was extended to
the Mississippi River, which Britain permitted the United States to
utilize for trade. The treaty also required Britain to remove all its
soldiers from any western
140

Figure 1

Old Northwest Region, 1783-90 in Wiley Sword, President
Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest,
1790-1795 (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1985), 2.

forts they occupied, but the British continued to hold the forts of
Michilimackinac, Detroit, Niagra, Oswego, Oswegatchie, and
several others for more than a decade after the treaty was signed. 235
This allowed them to protect their extensive western trade and
thereby maintain influence with their Native American allies,
especially as the United States pushed into western territory. 236
235
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The British presence in the Northwest Territory would be
problematic for the United States in the years to come.
After the Treaty of Paris, treaty commissioners from the
United States told the Indians living in the Northwest Territory that
they were a conquered people, and as such were not entitled to live
in the Northwest Territory. The Indians felt betrayed and
abandoned by the British, who had not consulted them about the
Treaty of Paris land cessions and left them to reconcile with the
Americans on their own. The American federal government
proceeded to develop their Indian policy around the assumption
that the United States was the sovereign power in the Northwest
Territory. 237 The implementation of this policy resulted in the
Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Treaty of McIntosh, and the Treaty of Fort
Finney. The United States used these three treaties to secure land
from the Indians in the Northwest Territory. With each of these
treaties, the United States commissioners indicated that they
wanted to make peace with the Native Americans. However, when
the Native American tribes arrived at the treaty meetings they
found that the commissioners had little intention of actually
negotiating with them.
In 1784, the United States made the Treaty of Fort Stanwix
with the Six Nations of the Iroquois. The Iroquois arrived at Fort
Stanwix in New York in October ready to discuss terms of peace.

237
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Instead, the congressional commissioners read them the terms of
the Treaty of Paris and they asked the Indians to choose a
boundary line between United States and Indian land. 238 As some
of the Iroquois tribes had been allied with the British during the
Revolutionary War, the commissioners felt justified in dominating
the treaty-making process. Cornplanter, a leader of the Seneca
nation, acted as a spokesman and proposed to uphold the Ohio
River boundary that had been established in a former treaty, the
1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix. Cornplanter explained that the
traditional role of the Six Nations was to speak on behalf of the
other western tribes and such a boundary would be in the best
interest of all the western Indian tribes. 239 However, this boundary
would have cut the United States off from much of the Northwest
Territory. The commissioners told the Iroquois that they had no
right to propose such a conservative boundary, as the United States
was now the sovereign power in the Northwest Territory. They
then offered the Iroquois an ultimatum: give up their land claims in
the Northwest Territory, or face war with the United States. 240
The 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix ultimately caused a divide
in the Iroquois nations. With each nation on different standing with
238
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the United States it was difficult for the Six Nations to remain
firmly unified and their confederacy began to deteriorate. Thus, the
dominance of the Iroquois declined among the western Indians. As
Cornplanter indicated in the treaty deliberations, the Iroquois had
traditionally been a dominant force in the intertribal dynamic of the
Northwest Territory. This gave way for the Shawnee and Miami,
two tribes affected by a later treaty, to become more dominant
powers in the west. 241
The Americans enacted a second peace treaty, known as the
Treaty of Fort McIntosh, with the Delaware and Wyandot tribes.
The signing of this treaty took place thirty miles northwest of
Pittsburgh in January, 1785. As with the Treaty of Fort Stanwix,
the commissioners threatened war if these Indian tribes did not
give up their lands and agree to live on designated United States
reservations in the northern part of Ohio. 242 The last of these three
treaties was made with the Shawnee, Miami, Potawatomi, and
various Wabash tribes. Known as the Treaty of Fort Finney, or the
Treaty at the Mouth of the Great Miami, it took place at the
convergence of the Miami and Ohio Rivers in January, 1786. It
restricted the Shawnee to a reservation next to the designated
Delaware and Wyandot reservations in the northern corner of Ohio

241
242

Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 26.
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and Indiana. 243 Aware of the results of the Treaties of Fort Stanwix
and Fort McIntosh, the Indians put up significant resistance at Fort
Finney. The Miami outright refused to comply with the terms of
the treaty and many of the Shawnee were strongly opposed to it as
well. Apprehensive about making war with the Americans,
however, resentful Shawnee leaders finally agreed to sign the
treaty.
It was fortunate for the United States that all of the tribes
they treated with agreed to their terms, for the United States did
not have the military or monetary means necessary to go to war
with the Native Americans. In fact, Congress' lack of funds was
one of the major reasons that the United States vied for complete
control of the Northwest Territory in the first place. At the end of
the Revolutionary War the Continental Congress was about $40
million in debt. 244 Under the Articles of Confederation, the United
States' first constitutional document, the government did not have
the ability to impose taxes on the American people. As such, the
acquisition of funds was crucial for the federal government. By
obtaining the Northwest Territory, the federal government could
sell tracts of land to settlers and maintain profitable trade by
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American Treaties, 1783-86 in Wiley Sword, President
Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest,
1790-1795 (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press,
1985), 22.

having access to the Mississippi River. 245 Additionally, without the
money to fund an army to remove the Indians, the federal
government would not be able to make good on their threats to go
to war with the Indians, and needed to entice them to leave through
peaceful means. United States Native American policy was
entirely driven by the notion that securing peace with the Indians
would be the easiest and cheapest way of acquiring the Northwest
Territory. 246

245
246

Ibid.
Ibid., 25.
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Hostilities on the Frontier and the Miami Confederacy
Soon after the conclusion of the Treaty of Fort Finney,
violence emerged on the frontier. It became clear just how
dissatisfied the Indians were with the treaty settlements. Henry
Knox, Secretary of War under the Continental Congress and during
Washington's presidency, was responsible for handling Indian
affairs. In 1786, Revolutionary War veteran General Josiah Harmar
wrote Knox to update him on the conditions in the Northwest
Territory. In his letter, Harmar explained to Knox that land
surveyors were eager to go out into the Northwest Territory and
were requesting escorts from Harmar. Because settlers were
already being attacked, Harmar feared that armed escorts would
bring out more hostilities from the angered Indians: "The murders
that have been committed lately upon the inhabitants passing up
and down the Ohio, indicate great dissatisfaction prevailing
amongst the Indians." 247
In the end months of 1786, various Indian tribes organized
a council in Sandusky, Ohio to discuss their dissatisfaction with
the treaties made with them and relations with the United States.
The Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, Miami,
Potawatomi, Cherokee, Six Nations, and members of the Wabash
247
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Confederacy were all present.

248

As each tribe had varying

experiences with the United States, there was some inconsistency
among their views. Some tribes, like the Delaware, Wyandot, and
the Seneca of the Six Nations were willing to promote amiable
relations with the United States. Joseph Brant, leader of the
Mohawk of the Six Nations, was not willing to settle for the
provisions made for his tribe in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, but was
inclined to seek assistance in acquiring new land from the British
in Canada rather than engage in war with the Americans. On the
other hand, the Shawnee, Miami, and members of the Wabash
Confederacy were adamant about fighting to protect their lands
from the Americans. 249 These tribes, along with several Iroquois
tribes, the Ojibwa, the Ottawa, and the Potawatomi, formed the
Miami Confederacy, or the Northwest Confederacy. 250 The Miami
Confederacy, which was united loosely under the leadership of
Miami warrior chief Little Turtle, formed with the common
purpose of preventing the United States from taking any lands past
the Ohio River. 251
Amidst these growing tensions, the United States drafted
the Northwest Ordinance in 1787. The purpose of the Northwest
248
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Ordinance was to dictate how the Northwest Territory might be
organized and inducted into the United States. However, since the
federal government was aware of Indian grievances, the Northwest
Ordinance also affirmed that the United States would respect
Indian rights in regards to assuming Indian lands. The ordinance
dictated that the Northwest Territory be divided into no less than
three and no more than five states. Once a piece of territory
accumulated at least 60,000 free inhabitants the government would
admit it into the United States on equal status with all other
states. 252
The ordinance also specifically stated that the "utmost good
faith shall always be observed towards the Indians" and that "their
lands and property shall never be taken from them without their
consent." 253 While historians such as Reginald Horsman have
asserted that the language of the Northwest Ordinance indicated a
shift in Indian policy at this time, the federal government's
subsequent actions do not reflect the language of the Ordinance,
and it seems that there was little shift in Native American policy
during this period. The Ordinance indicated willingness to
252
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negotiate with the Indians. However, rather than negotiate with the
Indians, the federal government's simply tried to pay for the land
that they previously asserted was conquered territory. While this
change in technique certainly suggested a shift in attitude on the
United States' part, their end goal of acquiring those lands by any
means necessary remained the same.
Under the Northwest Ordinance, veteran of the American
Revolution Arthur St. Clair became the governor of the Northwest
Territory. Part of his initial instructions from Congress was to
make treaties with the Indians should the situation require it. As
hostilities had increased in recent months, it was clear that a treaty
was necessary. St. Clair was directed to alleviate "all causes of
controversy, so that peace and harmony may continue between the
United States and the Indian tribes, the regulating trade, and
settling boundaries." Congress authorized money specifically for
the purpose of renewing a treaty with the Indians, hoping that
compensation for the land would settle any animosity with the
Indians. In order to protect United States interest out west, St.
Clair's instructions further required him to maintain the statutes of
the current treaties, "unless a change of boundary beneficial to the
United States can be obtained." Such specifications indicated that
the United States was not actually willing to negotiate with the
Indians, but rather wanted to reaffirm their former treaties. 254 The

254
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United States' actions therefore did not necessarily match the
language of their policies, and their treatment of the Indians
remained essentially the same. Although members of the federal
government may have thought that they were being more
conciliatory in offering monetary compensation for the lands they
assumed, the issue for the Indians was not just in the lack of
compensation. Rather, the Indians were upset that the federal
government assumed it had any right to their lands at all. The
government's offer to pay for the lands actually did little to
alleviate any animosity.
St. Clair met with delegates from the Six Nations,
Delaware, Wyandot, Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Potawatomi in
December, 1788. Though invited, the aggravated Shawnee and
Miami tribes refused to negotiate land cession with the United
States and refused to participate in this treaty council. 255 What the
Indians desired out of this new treaty was a change in the land
boundary back to the Ohio River. 256 St. Clair refused, saying that
the British had ceded these lands to the United States and that the
boundaries had been fixed by the Treaties of Fort Stanwix, Fort
McIntosh, and Fort Finney. St. Clair concluded deliberations with
the Indians by saying that the United States greatly desired peace
with the Indians, but would go to war with them if necessary. 257
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Although this treaty council offered the Indians another chance to
speak their piece, St. Clair still offered the same ultimatum.
Backed into a corner once more, these Indian tribes hesitantly
agreed. In January of 1789, St. Clair signed two treaties, together
known as the Treaty of Fort Harmar: one with the Six Nations, and
one with the Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Ojibwa, and
Potawatomi. Though this treaty was another attempt by the United
States to secure peace, it did nothing advantageous for either party.
Rather, it simply served to reaffirm previous United States treaties
and further anger the western Indian tribes.

Washington as President
As the Miami Confederacy become more organized and
aggravated by the new treaties, aggressions on the frontier
continued to escalate. When Washington entered the presidency in
1789, the hostilities seemed to be at their peak. Indian relations
were one of Washington's top priorities when he entered the
presidency. His aim was to find a way to make peace with the
Indians so that American citizens could begin to settle the
Northwest Territory without fear of conflict.
Washington's military career during the mid 1700s gave
him experience with Indians. As such, he was regarded as
somewhat of an Indian expert in the years leading up to his
presidency. Washington had always advocated that maintaining
peace with the Indians was crucial if the United States wanted to
152

settle the Northwest Territory. He believed that military action
should only be taken against the Indians as a last resort, as
purchasing Indian lands would be both cheaper and involve less
bloodshed. 258 Washington took this policy with him into his
presidency, and with violence at its peak, he developed several
initiatives to help secure peace with the Indians. Secretary of War
Knox was perhaps the most influential man in regards to Indian
policy during Washington's presidency. Washington and Knox
worked well together developing these policies, as they were
generally in agreement about how to handle Indian affairs. Both
Washington and Knox agreed that all measures should be taken to
promote peace and make treaties with the Indians rather than
engage in war. They believed it would be morally wrong to force
the Indians off their land without just cause. Knox had a
particularly sympathetic view towards the Indians. In a letter to
Washington, Knox expressed a desire protect Indian interests, as
the Indians were the "prior occupants" of the land, and as such
"possess[ed] the right of the Soil" in the Northwest Territory. He
was adamant that these lands "cannot be taken from them unless by
their free consent, or by the right of a just War…" To do otherwise
"would be a gross violation of the fundamental Laws of Nature and
of that destributive [sic] justice which is the glory of a nation." 259
Knox, like Washington, saw great potential for the nation
258
259
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in possession of the Northwest Territory. However, he believed
that there was little need to use force to acquire vast amounts of
land from the Indians: "As the settlements of the whites shall
approach near to the indian boundaries established by treaties, the
game will be diminished and the lands being valuable to the
indians only as hunting grounds, they will be willing to sell further
tracts for small considerations…" As their resources were
gradually depleted, Knox continued, the Indian populations would
decrease, "enabl[ing] the Union to operate against them [in battle]
with much greater prospect than at present." 260 Knox therefore
asserted that making peace with the Indians was in the best interest
of all, as going to war with them would hardly be worthwhile when
the United States would likely be able to acquire more lands from
them in the coming years.
In

general,

Washington's

Indian

policies

involved

strengthening the power of the federal government so that it could
better handle Indian relations. One of Washington's main goals
was to make sure that the federal government, not individual states,
was in charge of handling all Indian relations and treaties. In a
letter to Washington July, 1789, Knox confirmed his agreement
that the "general Sovereignty must possess the right of making all
treaties on the execution of violation of which depend peace or
war."
260
261

261

Given the recent rise in hostilities on the frontier,

Ibid., 494.
Ibid., 138.
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Washington saw the demonstration of federal authority in Indian
affairs as crucial. In his mind, centralization of federal power
would enable the government to hold Indians and American
citizens accountable for any violence they caused, thereby
discouraging them from engaging in further hostilities.
There were, however, significant set-backs in Washington's
efforts to ensure peace by promoting Indian confidence in the
federal

government.

The

federal

government's

failure

to

immediately engage in military combat with the Indians caused the
citizens on the frontier to lose faith in the federal government's
ability to protect them. They therefore implemented their own kind
of punishment against the Indians, continuing more localized
aggressions towards Indians. This in turn made the Indians
question the federal government's sincerity and ability to uphold
their promises of holding the frontiersmen responsible for killing
Indians. Unfortunately, many of the victimized tribes were not
actively hostile towards the United States. The Miami and
Shawnee, two more western-based tribes, were particularly hostile
towards citizens on the frontier, but angry frontiersmen generally
attacked Indians indiscriminately. Governor St. Clair wrote
Washington in September, 1789 explaining the situation: "It is not
to be expected, sir, that the Kentucky people will or can submit
patiently to the cruelties and depredations of those savages; they
are in the habit of retaliation, perhaps, without attending precisely
155

to the nations from which the injuries are received…" 262 Thus, the
hostilities on the frontier not only aggravated already existing
animosity with the Indians, but also threatened the peaceful
relations that the United States had managed to secure with more
eastern-based tribes such as the Seneca.
While Washington and Knox both wanted to secure peace,
neither was willing to compromise the overall well-being of the
nation or the protection of its citizens. Washington had instructed
St. Clair to use military force on the frontier only as a last resort,
but by 1790, it was becoming increasingly clear that a last resort
might be necessary to subdue the Indians. 263 In a "Summary
Statement of the Situation of the Frontiers by the Secretary of
War" Knox explained that Josiah Harmar had given numerous
accounts of the "depredations of the Indians on the boats going
down the Ohio…" Knox noted the "bad effect [these hostilities
had] on the public mind…The result of this whole information
shows the inefficiency of defensive operations against the banditti
Shawnese and Cherokees, and some of the Wabash Indians on the
north-west of the Ohio." He therefore concluded that a military
expedition to punish the Indians and defend the frontier was the
right course of action. 264 It was no secret that Washington wanted
to build a stronger army when he entered the presidency. In his
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first address to Congress in January of 1790, he formally proposed
his goal of "of providing for the common defense." Washington
was a firm believer that being "prepared for war is one of the most
effectual means of preserving peace." 265 He hoped that by building
up the national army he could intimidate the Indians into agreeing
to peace with the United States. 266

Harmar's Defeat
Still hoping for a peaceful outcome, Congress nevertheless
agreed to Washington's plan of using the army to intimidate the
Indians. In 1790, Congress authorized an expansion of the army.
Led by Josiah Harmar, the new army would have one thousand
regulars and fifteen hundred militiamen from the states of
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.

267

By late 1790, the

increasing conflict on the frontier made it clear that the Indians
were not going to be intimidated into making peace, and the United
States government would have to use force against them. Referring
back to the Northwest Ordinance, Washington and Congress
viewed this military expedition as a "just and lawful war," in which
they would swiftly punish the Indians for their destruction on the
frontier. In Knox's orders to Harmar on June 7, 1790, Knox stated
265
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that "No other remedy remains, but to extirpate, utterly, if possible,
the [Indian] banditti." 268 The plan was for Harmar to lead the main
body of troops west from Fort Washington to attack Miami
villages along the Maumee River, while Major John Hamtramck
came from Fort Knox in the west with three hundred regulars and
three hundred Kentucky militiamen. 269
As the United States prepared for their military expedition,
the federal government came to the agreement that the British
should be made aware of their plans. Since the British had not
actually left their western forts after the signing of the Treaty of
Paris, the United States did not want the British to think the
military expedition was aimed at pushing them out of the
Northwest Territory and risk renewing hostilities with them. As
such, Knox ordered St. Clair to contact the British commander at
Detroit and explain that the expedition was purely for the purpose
of punishing Indians who had been aggressive towards the United
States. 270
Although the British commander assured St. Clair that they
were not concerned about this, they immediately notified British
traders in Miami villages, who assisted the Indians by giving them
supplies to prepare for an attack from the United States. When
Harmar and his men reached the Miami villages in the middle of
268
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October, they found them abandoned, as the Indians had been
warned ahead of time. The army burned the villages regardless,
thinking that if they could not punish the Indians directly, they
could at least destroy their homes and supplies. Meanwhile,
Harmar sent Colonel John Hardin and approximately three hundred
men to pursue the fleeing Indians. Instead of a swift subjugation of
the Indians, Hardin found an ambush waiting for him and his men.
Taken by surprise, the men lost all organization and dispersed. The
militiamen fled the scene completely, leaving the regulars to fend
for themselves. After a brutal attack that left almost two hundred
dead and several dozen wounded, the regulars retreated back to the
rest of the army. 271
Washington was extremely angered by this loss and blamed
the defeat on Harmar's perceived deficiencies. In a letter to Knox,
Washington accused Harmar of being both a drunkard and an
ineffective leader: "I expected little from the moment I heard he
was a drunkard. I expected less as soon as I heard that on this
account no confidence was reposed to him by the people of the
Western Country—And I gave up all hope of Success, as soon as I
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Figure 3

Federal Campaigns, Sept.-Oct., 1790 in Wiley Sword, President
Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest,
1790-1795 (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press,
1985), 90.

heard that there were disputes with him about command." 272
Despite Washington's fervor in his criticisms of Harmar, the
responsibility of the defeat did not rest solely on Harmar's
shoulders. In fact, most of Washington's assertions about Harmar's
conduct were false. According to Washington biographer John
Ferling, Washington was inclined to find scapegoats to blame
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when situations under his command deteriorated. 273 Harmar was
certainly the easiest man to blame in this instance, and his
reputation never fully recovered.
In truth, the failure of the expedition should be attributed to
a myriad of factors, the most significant being the poor quality of
the militia. The militia, comprised of ill-trained men not entirely fit
for military work, made up the majority of the military force of this
expedition. Their haste to abandon the battle as soon as they were
under attack left the regulars severely outnumbered, which
essentially forced them to retreat. 274 Moreover, the entire force was
significantly weakened when Harmar authorized his troops to
separate into different groups. Only a small portion of the available
men were actually present during the Indian attack, as the rest had
remained to burn the villages. 275 In the planning of this expedition,
Congress specifically authorized the recruitment of more men so
that Harmar would be prepared should the Indians have managed
to accrue a strong force of warriors against them. Regardless of the
reasoning behind Harmar's failure, hostilities on the frontier
increased as a result of this direct attack on the Indians. Fear
among frontier settlers was rising, and they demanded that the
federal government act to protect them. The federal government
hastily began plans for a new military expedition.
273
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St. Clair's Defeat
Washington and Congress knew that they had to deal with
the Indian problem immediately. Many Americans had not
believed the Indians capable of raising a force able to defeat an
organized American army. The results of the expedition proved
otherwise and frontier settlers began to panic that they would be
the victims of a mass Indian attack. Knox and Washington quickly
set about planning for a second expedition. They appealed to
Congress for an expansion of the army to three thousand men. This
time they called for twelve hundred regulars, thirteen hundred
volunteer levies, and five hundred rangers. 276 It was not too
difficult for Washington and Knox to convince Congress that such
an expansion was necessary, as both Harmar and Washington's
administration had blamed the failure of the expedition at least
partly on the inadequacy of the militia.
Harmar's failed expedition had threatened the federal
government's reputation—it was now in jeopardy of being seen as
incapable of protecting its citizens and ineffective in handling
disputes. Yet, in some sense Harmar's defeat was advantageous to
276
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Washington, as it enabled him to set the foundation for a
reformation of the militia system. Washington's contemporaries
had known his distaste for the militia since the Revolutionary War,
and many had expected him to appeal for the creation of a large
national army when he came into office. Although Washington
avoided aligning with any particular political faction, like many of
his Federalist contemporaries he desired a strong standing army to
protect the nation and demonstrate the power of the federal
government. However, Washington was aware of political tensions
between the emerging Federalist and Democratic-Republican
political parties. He did not want party alliances to divide the
nation, and he avoided aligning with either party, despite his
agreement with certain Federalist views. He knew that pushing for
a standing army upon his entrance into the presidency would be
viewed unfavorably by many citizens. Many Americans associated
standing armies with martial law from their experiences with the
presence of the British army during the Revolution. 277
Washington hoped that by using more regulars and
volunteers the army would be an adequately trained force to
accomplish the goal of subduing the Indians. Unlike militiamen,
regulars and volunteers were required to submit to traditional
military discipline. These men would not only be better trained, but
also act more professionally in the face of battle. 278 Washington
277
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appointed St. Clair as major general of this new army, hoping that
he would prove a better leader than Harmar.
St. Claire's plan was to leave Philadelphia in March, 1791,
lead his army to Fort Washington in order to meet Kentucky
militiamen, and then proceed with the attack in the Wabash Valley.
However, St. Clair left Philadelphia later than planned and faced
additional unforeseen delays, as he had difficulty acquiring
sufficient numbers of men and adequate supplies. St. Clair did not
reach Fort Washington until the middle of May, and even then not
all the militia had arrived from other states. The troops were not
fully convened until September, at which point it was late in the
season to be embarking on a military expedition as they risked
suffering through the winter months. 279 St. Clair, however, assured
Knox in a letter on September 18, 1791 "that every possible
exertion shall be made to bring the campaign to a speedy and
happy issue." 280 Despite the delays St. Clair felt secure his ability
to lead a successful expedition. He was certain of the superior
military ability of the United States army. He felt, as did Knox and
many of his other contemporaries, sure that the disjointed war
tactics of the Indians would be no match for his disciplined army,
even if the Indians managed to outnumber them. 281
St. Clair should have not have so greatly underestimated his
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opponents; he and his men expected the Indians to be severely
disorganized. But what they did not know was that the Indians, led
by the Miami and Shawnee tribes, had gone to Detroit after the
incident with Harmar to request assistance from the British. Blue
Jacket, one of the Shawnee leaders, appealed to the British saying
the United States had plans to take all their lands: "as a People we
are determined to meet the approaches of an Enemy, who came not
to check the Insolence of individuals, but with a premeditated
design to root us out of our Land, which we and our forefathers
and children were and are bound to defend, and which we are
determined to do." 282 The commanding officers in Detroit told the
Indians that they could offer no troops to support them, as they
would risk getting into conflict with the United States. They did,
however, offer the Indians supplies they needed to take on the
American troops.
Not only were the Indians able to obtain British support,
but they also managed to become much more organized than St.
Clair, Knox, or Washington could have anticipated. Harmar's
expedition had confirmed the fears of Indian tribes in the Wabash
that the United States had the intention of usurping all western
Indian lands. Other tribes, such as the Kickapoo, Wea, and
Piankeshaw, who had been on the fence about combating the
Americans were now convinced of American intentions and came
282
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to the aid of the Miami and the Shawnee. 283 The desperate fear of
losing their lands banned these tribes together. Having caught wind
of the American army's plans, they made their way to the Miami
villages to prepare to ambush the American army.
On November 4, 1791 as St. Clair and his men finally made
their way to the Miami villages, they were met with a full-blown
Indian attack. 284 The Indians completely surrounded the American
army with organization that blindsided St. Clair and overwhelmed
his men. The Indians used their traditional style of warfare and
their knowledge of European war tactics to their advantage. The
Indians were used to fighting as individuals, and they swiftly
overtook American soldiers. They specifically targeted military
officers, as they knew that without leadership the American
soldiers would be completely disoriented and unable to fight as a
unit. 285 Those who survived the attack retreated to Fort Jefferson
on St. Clair's orders. The losses were devastating. Thirty-seven
officers and nearly six hundred enlisted men were killed, while
thirty-two officers and approximately two-hundred and fifty men
were wounded. 286
On November 9, after St. Clair and his men had made it
back to Fort Washington, St. Clair wrote Knox to tell him of the
terrible loss. Washington was furious about the results of this
283

Calloway, The Victory with No Name, 106.
Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, 89.
285
Calloway, The Victory with No Name, 119.
286
Ibid., 127.
284

166

second campaign. He was now in a difficult position and faced a
great deal of criticism. How could he explain how the military
expedition had failed a second time? While he was able to blame
the incompetency of Harmar for the failure of the first expedition,
he knew he could not blame St. Clair this time, as it would only
show that he was unable to provide a capable general for this
task. 287 Similarly, the militia could not be solely to blame, as much
of the militia of the last expedition had been replaced by regulars
for St. Clair's expedition. 288 Washington had to report to Congress
news of the defeat, and a special committee was developed to
investigate what led to the loss of the expedition.
As the committee sought to get to the bottom of the matter,
newspapers such as the New York Journal & Patriotic Register,
Columbian Centinel, Connecticut Courant, and Maryland Gazette
all published accounts of St. Clair's Defeat, which stirred up a
variety of public opinions. 289 A typical reaction to St. Clair's
Defeat was a desire for revenge on the murderous Indians. A
Kentucky resident wrote to a friend in Philadelphia, “The news of
the defeat of the troops under Gov. St. Clair by the Indians, so far
from disheartening has filled every man in Kentucky with a thirst
for revenge.” 290
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Some members of the public were angered that the United
States had attempted such an incursion in the first place, and felt
that the United States was causing unnecessary problems with the
Indians: "Are we not already in possession of more lands than can
be settled for a century at least? … What better right have we to
march through the centre of their country, than Great-Britain
would have to march a body of troops through the centre of the
United States?" 291 In speaking so vehemently against the Indian
expeditions, this writer, under the pseudonym "Anti-Pizaro,"
accused the federal government of impeding on the rights of the
Indians to acquire more lands. He also raised questions about the
real motivations for such an excursion: "Is it to conquer more
lands, or to serve as a pretence for augmenting the standing
army?" 292 The public was clearly questioning the government's
Indian policies and motivations in the Indian war. Many worried
that it was part of a Federalist ploy to give the government more
power.
Another segment, this time appearing in the National
Gazette, seconded that sentiment:
The principles of the war it is hoped,
will be thoroughly investigated, that
the revenues of the States should not
be wantonly expended in disgraceful
campaigns. Americans having just
291
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freed themselves from an expensive
war, it is our interest to promote
friendship and harmony with all the
world, and not to sacrifice our young
men and our money, to acquire
territory by war, while so much land
remains unsettled, and which courts
our cultivation under the auspices of
peace. 293
This author stated that the federal government's reckless ambitions
to secure the Northwest Territory were a waste of both men and
money. Moreover, he implied that engaging in an unnecessary war
to acquire lands painted the United States in a negative light to
other nations, making the United States seem greedy and
uncompromising.
Yet, there was also a portion of the public who supported
Washington and his Native American policies. Rather than
asserting that the United States had selfish and unjust motives in
sending soldiers into the Northwest Territory, these citizens
defended Washington and the federal government, assuring readers
that Washington had been forced into taking military action in
order to protect the nation. In one article posted in the Connecticut
Gazette gave an explanation of how treaties were attempted with
the hostile Wabash Indians, but they declined the offer and
continued their hostilities: "The campaign, therefore, of the last
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Figure 4

St. Clair's Defeat Battle Map in Colin G. Calloway, The
Victory with No Name: The Native American Defeat of
the First American Army (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 118.
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and this year, were measures of necessity—The Indians had been
invading our frontiers, and had killed many hundred innocent men,
women and children..." 294 Citizens of this opinion were grateful
that the government had taken action to protect them.
These inconsistent views about the Northwest Indian War
are representative of the larger national debate at this time. Party
alliances were becoming increasingly distinct, which resulted in
starkly contrasting views about what the roles and responsibilities
of the federal government should be. The special committee
focused on many of these issues in their investigation of St. Clair's
Defeat, questioning the amount of authority the federal
government should have and what the responsibilities of elected
officials were. Ultimately St. Clair was pardoned from any
responsibility for the defeat. Congress and other elected officials
were blamed for the delay in securing adequate funds for the
expedition. Although it was not overtly stated, Washington and
Knox also received a great deal of blame, as they had given the
orders for St. Clair's campaign. 295 St. Clair's Defeat had brought on
a great deal of criticism of the federal government.

Assertion of Federal Power and Wayne's Campaign
It was clear at this point that there was a divide within the
United States about whether this Indian war should have taken
294
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place at all. Many people were questioning the moral validity of
the war as well as the creation of an army to deal with the issue.
The political divide between

Democratic-Republicans and

Federalists became much more distinct as Congress and
Washington's administration debated what course of action to
take.

296

The Democratic-Republicans thought that the federal

government was out of its depth and abusing its power to take over
the Northwest Territory, while the Federalists tended to support the
power of the federal government. Throughout the debate
Washington maintained that the federal government needed to be
consistent and continue its aims to take control of the Northwest
Territory. 297 Now more than ever he felt it was essential to the
federal government's reputation that they succeed.
Congress tended to agree with Washington. After two
failed expeditions, it would make the United States appear weak to
simply give up. The federal government sincerely needed to prove
its capability to its citizens. However, America's armed forces
desperately needed to be salvaged after St. Clair's defeat and
Congress feared that the frontier would experience the full extent
of Indian wrath while they were trying to rebuild the army. 298
Therefore, while Washington and Knox worked on a plan for the
new army, Congress authorized peace commissioners to meet with
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the Indians early in 1792. The Shawnee and Miami attended the
meeting, along with several of the tribes that allied with them. The
Shawnee and Miami also managed to convince the Six Nations to
negotiate as well, although they had minimal involvement with the
Northwest Indian War.
It is unlikely that the federal government actually expected
peace to come out of this meeting. Although it certainly would
have been optimal for the United States for the Indians to concede
to give up their lands peacefully, no one believed that to be a
realistic outcome. British lieutenant governor of Upper Canada
John Graves Simcoe indicated that he believed that the Indians and
Americans commissioners had met for the same reason: not
actually to secure peace, but to procrastinate. In fact, he believed
that the meeting was only a way for both sides to be assured in
their missions: for the Americans, that the Indians needed to be
destroyed; for the Indians, that the United States must be stopped
in their efforts to take Indians lands. 299
The peace talk went exactly as expected: neither side was
willing to compromise. The American commissioners attempted to
assure the Indians that they wanted to make peace with them, while
the Indians declared to the commissioners that if the United States
did not abide by the Ohio River boundary line, there could be no
peace. The commissioners held firm, saying that as the Indians'

299

Calloway, The Victory with No Name, 147.

173

land had been ceded in the Treaty of Paris. The Indians responded
that they had never agreed to give possession of their lands to the
king of England, so it was not his land to cede to the United
States. 300 The Indians then declared that they would not leave the
lands that were rightfully theirs. The American commissioners
then resolved to return home, unable to make peace once more.
Meanwhile, Washington and Knox had been hard at work
reforming the United States army. Now that circumstances
demanded an army for the protection of the nation, Washington
was able to develop a large standing army and reform the militia
system, as he and his Federalist contemporaries had always wanted
to do. 301 Knox developed a proposal for a new army of five
thousand men to be enlisted for three years. In his proposal, Knox
asserted that use of the militia for situations such as this would not
be sufficient: "while it is acknowledged that mounted militia may
be very proper for sudden enterprises, of short duration, it is
conceived that militia are utterly unsuitable to carry on and
terminate the war in which we are engaged, with honor and
success." 302 Knox and Washington also reorganized the army from
an infantry, cavalry, and artillery into four sublegions, each
commanded by a brigadier general. Washington appointed General
Anthony Wayne, another veteran of the Revolution, to command
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this army.
As for reforming the militia, Congress passed two acts that
changed militia regulations. The first gave the president the ability
to call upon the state militias when the nation was in jeopardy. The
second act required all capable free white men between the ages of
eighteen and forty-five to enroll in the militia. Overall, these
military reforms strengthened the power of the federal government,
as they gave the government much more military authority.
With this new force under his command, General Wayne
arrived at Fort Washington in May, 1793 and began to prepare for
the expedition. From the beginning this campaign went much more
smoothly than the others. By the end of December Wayne and his
men had made their way to the site of St. Clair's Defeat,
established Fort Greenville, and set themselves up to remain there
for the winter. 303 In June, the Indians attempted an attack on the
fort, but were fought off by the American army. The Potawatomi,
Ojibwa, and Ottawa tribes were discouraged by this unsuccessful
attack and abandoned the rest of the Miami Confederacy, greatly
reducing the military power of their union. The army under
Wayne's command was far more prepared for frontier fighting than
that of either St. Clair or Harmar. To further weaken the Indian
forces, Wayne's plan was to target the Indian villages' food and
supplies as he and his army made their way along the Auglaize
303

Calloway, The Victory with No Name, 148; Horsman, Expansion and
American Indian Policy, 99.

175

River. By August, Wayne and his men held the center of the
Miami Confederacy at the intersection of the Maumee and
Auglaize Rivers.
On August 19, the Indians prepared to meet the American
army. The battle that came to be known as the Battle of Fallen
Timbers took place the following morning. When the battle
occurred, it was clear the Indians were severely outnumbered. This
time the American army's organization and discipline were more
than adequate to take on the Indians. The Americans quickly
overtook the Indians, who retreated and sought assistance from the
British at Fort Miami. The British, despite their previous
assistance, were now engaged in the French Revolution in Europe
and unwilling to risk conflict with the Americans. They refused to
help the Indians, leaving them to fend for themselves. 304 Thus,
Wayne's army was easily able to overtake the retreating Indians.
The Battle of Fallen Timbers was, finally, an American victory.
In December of 1794, Wayne met with the Indian tribes to
discuss peace. They agreed to meet in June of 1795 at Greenville
to set a formal treaty. 305 That summer, the Indians officially signed
the Treaty of Greenville that waived their rights to two-thirds of
Ohio and some smaller pieces of land in Indiana. Leaders of the
Shawnee, Wyandot, Ottawa, and Delaware all signed the
document. The Northwest Indian War was finally over and the
304
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Figure 5

Wayne's Campaign, July-Aug., 1790 in Wiley Sword, President
Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest,
1790-1795 (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press,
1985), 274.
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federal government had demonstrated its authority. To uphold
authority in the Northwest Territory, the federal government
maintained a military presence on the frontier to supply forts that
protected western trade. 306 Around the same time, in November,
1794, United States delegate John Jay successfully negotiated a
treaty with Britain. Jay's Treaty, as it was known, required Britain
to finally relinquish its posts on the frontiers. With both treaties
secured, the Americans finally had complete access to the
Northwest Territory.

Conclusion
What

Washington

and

the

United

States

federal

government failed to realize was that from the moment the Treaty
of Paris was signed, conflict with the Indians was inevitable. So
long as Indian policy operated under the assumption that the
United States was the sovereign power in the Northwest Territory,
Indian tribes were going to resist. The Indians had never
recognized Great Britain as the previous sovereign power in the
Northwest Territory, and thus felt the United States had no valid
claim to the lands, especially since the Indians had no desire to
give up those lands. The federal government wanted the
impossible: they wanted the lands in the Northwest Territory and
they wanted them peacefully. Their unwillingness to compromise
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any of the lands in the Northwest Territory combined with their
lack of respect for Indian rights to those lands set up explosive
tensions that no amount of peace treaties could alleviate.
When Washington entered the presidency, his plan to
secure peace with the Indians revolved around the strengthening of
the federal government. Mainly, he wanted both the Indians and
the individual states to recognize the federal government as the
authority on Indian affairs, and to strengthen the United States'
military force in order to enforce the federal government's power.
As violence escalated on the frontier, the demands of citizens for
protection from the federal government erupted. However, the new
nation’s fragile state meant the federal government had little
military power or funds to accomplish this. Two failed military
expeditions against the Indians resulted in a federal reform of the
army and militia system, significantly strengthening the power of
the federal government. Without the violence of the Northwest
Indian War, the demands for protection from United States citizens
would not have driven Congress to make such federal reforms.
In this way, the events of the Northwest Indian War
ultimately contributed to determining the role of the federal
government in the early republic. With their demands for
protection, American citizens on the frontier inadvertently
conceded to a more centralized, more powerful government. Much
to the chagrin of many of these citizens, the desire for a
government that had the strength to protect them also created a
179

government with a capable force to use against them. When the
Whiskey Rebellion erupted in Western Pennsylvania, Washington
was able to quell the violent insurrection by calling upon the state
militias in July, 1794. Such a use of force served to illustrate the
newfound capabilities of the federal government to enforce their
laws and policies throughout the nation.
Congress was right in asserting that the fate of the nation
was tied to the acquisition of the Northwest Territory; yet, it was
tied in unforeseeable ways. Beyond economic security, the events
of the Northwest Indian War enabled Washington to achieve some
of

his goals for the nation. Washington secured a stronger,

more centralized government by calling for consolation of Indian
affairs under the federal government and the creation of a federal
army to protect the nation. Doing so ultimately allowed the United
State to finally achieve victory in the Northwest Indian War. These
policies certainly sparked contention among both citizens and
Indians, raising questions as to the validity and justification of the
United States' actions during the Northwest Indian War, the
morality of which continues to be debated. Nevertheless, such a
victory proved to American citizens, Indians, and European powers
looking on that the United States was not only a force to be
reckoned with, but worthy of "the respect of the world."
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